Articles Posted in Workers’ Compensation

maze2Florida’s civil liability and workers’ compensation systems handle legal matters for people injured or who have died in accidents. The systems have some similarities and differences. The biggest differences are that the plaintiff must prove fault to recover under civil law, and recoveries for non-economic damages (such as pain and suffering) are not available in workers’ compensation cases. It is not always obvious which remedy route is the best to follow. Most of the time, the aggrieved party does not have a choice.

Employers and fellow-employees are immune from civil lawsuits for work-related accidents. See sections 440.10 and 440.11, Florida Statutes. In other words, the workers’ compensation system is the harmed individual’s exclusive remedy.

Exceptions arise when the employer has failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation (440.10(1) and 440.11(1)(a)), the employer commits an intentional tort (440.11(1)(b), or the fellow-employee acts with willful and wanton disregard or unprovoked physical aggression or with gross negligence (440.11(1)).

Another exception may apply when 1) the employer makes a representation of a material fact that is contrary to a later-asserted position; 2) the harmed worker relies on that representation; and 3) the worker is damaged by changing his or her position in reliance on said representation. See Specialty Emp. Leasing v. Davis, 737 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1981)). This exception is known as equitable estoppel.

In McNair v. Dorsey, 291 So.3d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), McNair was injured while carrying a tree branch to a wood chipper. The employer first asserted that there was “no compensable accident.” In a later pretrial stipulation, the employer claimed that no compensable accident occurred, and took the position that McNair’s accident did not occur within the course and scope of his employment.

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greed2For as long as our law firm has been handling Florida workers’ compensation cases, the amount injured workers’ attorneys may receive as a fee has always been a hot topic. The two main factors driving the conversation are the injured workers’ share of a recovery, typically through a settlement, and limiting litigation. While the Florida Legislature pays lip service to the first factor, the second factor is the actual driving force.

Since 1998, when Republicans, with the election of Jeb Bush as governor, took full total control of the lawmaking process in Florida, the workers’ compensation laws have been tailored to make it difficult for lawyers representing injured workers (a/k/a “claimants”) to earn a sustainable income. The stated policy of the laws has been couched as promoting a greater share of recovered proceeds allocated to claimants instead of attorneys’ fees, but the silent truth is to make it difficult for claimants to hire lawyers willing and able to fight toe-to-toe against employers and their workers’ compensation insurance carriers. Bottom line: There is nothing Big Business hates more than pipsqueaks, i.e., injured workers, being able to challenge them on a level playing field. They want the field tilted in their favor.

The most famous example of this blatant abuse came to a head in Castellanos v. Next Door Company, 192 So.3d 431 (Fla. 2016). Marvin Castellanos was injured while working with Next Door Company. With the help of an attorney, Castellanos prevailed in his workers’ compensation claim, after the attorney successfully refuted numerous defenses raised by the employer and its insurance carrier. However, because the statute then in effect limited his ability to recover attorney’s fees to a sliding scale based on the amount of workers’ compensation benefits obtained, the fee awarded to Castellanos’ successful attorney amounted to only $1.53 per hour for 107.2 hours of work.

The Florida Supreme Court found the statute, which essentially became effective in 2003, unconstitutional. It understood that the statute was designed to make it difficult for injured workers to engage competent legal counsel. Citing Davis v. Keeto, Inc., 463 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (quoting Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 99 A.2d 664, 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953)) the court noted that a claimant proceeding “without the aid of competent counsel” would be as “helpless as a turtle on its back.” At 371.

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doctorSome injured workers are hurt so badly that they require attendant care. This benefit can take many forms, from active assistance with such things as eating and bathing, to what is called surveillance, or oversight.

As written, Florida Statute 440.13(2)(b) seemingly places the full burden on the injured worker to provide the employer/carrier (E/C) with a detailed description of his or her attendant care needs before E/C is obligated to furnish anything:

The employer shall provide appropriate professional or nonprofessional attendant care performed only at the direction and control of a physician when such care is medically necessary. The physician shall prescribe such care in writing. The employer or carrier shall not be responsible for such care until the prescription for attendant care is received by the employer and carrier, which shall specify the time periods for such care, the level of care required, and the type of assistance required.

Employers/Carriers oftentimes rely on this language to act indifferently towards providing the benefit. Thankfully, the courts don’t take kindly to this type of conduct.

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laptop-work-1260785-m-1For the most part, Florida workers involved in industrial accidents have little control over which medical providers are authorized to treat them under the state’s workers’ compensation system. Control of the medical care is mostly held by the employers and their workers’ compensation insurance carriers (E/C). Section 440.13, Florida Statutes lays out the parameters regarding the provision and control of medical care.

Control impacts the nature and quality of medical care received, the receipt of indemnity (money) benefits, and settlement value. Doctors selected by E/C tend to render opinions favoring E/C. Injured workers have limited ability to wrest control of their care from E/C.

440.13(2)(f) lets injured workers ask E/C to authorize another treating doctor. Barring exceptional circumstances, the request can only be made one time in each case. E/C has five days from receipt of the request to select another doctor of its choosing or lose the right. If the selection is not made within the five days, the injured worker, also known as the claimant, gets to select the doctor. This doctor then becomes authorized. This is a big deal.

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A lien is a claim held by a party against the settlement or judgment in a personal injury or death case for reimbursement of damages it has paid in the case. This blog will discuss two types of liens commonly arising in death cases, the Medicare lien and the workers’ compensation lien.

Medicare pays medical expenses while both medical and indemnity (money) benefits are paid by the employer and its insurance carrier in Florida workers’ compensation cases. Each type is often paid in association with cases where the victim ends up dying.

42 CFR sec. 411.24 sets forth Medicare’s lien rights. Section 440.39, Florida Statutes covers the employer/carrier’s lien rights in workers’ compensation cases.

Section 786.21 of Florida’s Wrongful Death Act defines the type of benefits available in civil law wrongful death cases. Section 440.16 does this in the context of workers’ compensation cases. In some instances, a recovery under both laws is available for the same accident.

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worker2It is sometimes possible for employees injured on the job in Florida to be compensated through both the state’s workers’ compensation system and its civil justice system. As to the compensation available and the manner in which the compensation is sought and received, the systems are more different than they are alike. One of the primary differences is that compensation for human damages such as bodily injury, pain and suffering, disfigurement, mental anguish, and the loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life, are elements of a civil remedy but not workers’ compensation. In a nutshell, workers’ compensation benefits are limited to medical and indemnity benefits. Non-economic damages, which can amount to millions of dollars, are not recoverable.

What limits most employees from being able to receive the civil remedy is the legal concept known as workers’ compensation immunity. The basic concept is set forth in Fla. Stat. Sec. 440.11(1):

The liability of an employer prescribed in s. 440.10 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability, including vicarious liability, of such employer to any third-party tortfeasor and to the employee, the legal representative thereof, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death….

Special laws have been devised to deal with workers’ compensation immunity in the context of contractor-subcontractor relationships. See Fla. Stat. Sec. 440.10(b)-(f). For the employees of contractors and subcontractors, the general law is set forth in s. 440.10(b):

In case a contractor sublets any part or parts of his or her contract work to a subcontractor or subcontractors, all of the employees of such contractor and subcontractor or subcontractors engaged on such contract work shall be deemed to be employed in one and the same business or establishment, and the contractor shall be liable for, and shall secure, the payment of compensation to all such employees, except to employees of a subcontractor who has secured such payment.

“[T]he purpose of section 440.10 . . . [is] ‘to insure [sic] that a particular industry will be financially responsible for injuries to those employees working in it, even though the prime contractor employs an independent contractor to perform part or all of its contractual undertaking.’” Gator Freightways, Inc. v. Roberts, 550 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Roberts v. Gator Freightways, Inc., 538 So. 2d 55, 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)); see also Crum Servs. v. Lopez, 975 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (explaining that section 440.10(1)(b) “is designed to ensure that employees engaged in the same contract work are covered by workers’ compensation, regardless of whether they are employees of the general contractor or its subcontractor”).

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IMG_2410-207x300Our client, a construction site supervisor, was injured off-premises at the end of his lunch break. The beginning and end of lunch were signaled by a loud horn. He and his brother traveled by car to a nearby 7-11 to purchase lunch items. They returned to the area near the worksite to eat lunch in the parked car. When the return-to-work horn sounded, our client went to the trunk of his car to retrieve his hard hat and safety harness. As he was standing there, the car behind him was struck from behind by another vehicle and pushed into him, causing him to be crushed between that vehicle and his own. He sustained significant injuries requiring a one-week stay in Ryder Trauma Center in Miami.

Initially, the workers’ compensation insurance carrier balked at accepting compensability of the injury. Its position was that since the accident happened offsite during a lunch break, it did not arise out of and in the course and scope of our client’s employment. After studying the case law and gathering more facts, the carrier reversed course.

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surgeon-3-391477-mWe represent a woman who fell at work. The employer sent her to a clinic the same day for treatment. However, because of miscommunications between the employer and the clinic, she never got in to see a doctor despite waiting more than two hours. While in the waiting room, our client began experiencing stroke-like symptoms. She phoned her daughter to take her to the hospital. She was admitted to the hospital and underwent a series of tests mostly aimed at the stroke-like symptoms. She was discharged 24 hours after being admitted. The hospital bill was close to $100,000.

Our client injured her back and feet in the fall. She did not strike her head. The workers’ compensation insurance carrier has accepted responsibility for the orthopedic injuries. However, it is not considering paying the hospital bill. It may have to pay the bill.

It is well established in the case law that diagnostic testing is always compensable if the purpose is to find out the cause of the injured worker’s symptoms. See Arnau v. Winn Dixie Stores, 105 So.3d 669, 671 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) citing Nealy v. City of W. Palm Beach, 491 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“Whenever the purpose of the diagnostic test is to determine the cause of a claimant’s symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident, the cost of the diagnostic test is compensable.”); see also Superior Concrete Constr. v. Olsen, 616 So.2d 183, 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)Perry v. Ridgecrest Int’l, 548 So.2d 826, 827-28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). This is true even if the tests prove the symptoms are unrelated to the compensable injury. Nealy, 491 So.2d at 586.

The foundation for these principles is found in Florida statute 440.13. Under paragraph 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2023), employers are required to furnish “such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance for such period as the nature of the injury or process of recovery may require.” Medically necessary treatment includes “any medical service or medical supply which is used to identify or treat an illness or injury.” § 440.13(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2023).

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doctor-267x300Following compensable work-related accidents, employers and their insurance carriers (commonly collectively referred to as “E/C”), are supposed to furnish injured workers with the medical care prescribed in Florida Statute section 440.13.(2)(a). The key language of the statute reads as follows:

Subject to the limitations specified elsewhere in this chapter, the employer shall furnish to the employee such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require….

Interestingly, this provision has been interpreted to include medical treatment for unrelated conditions if such treatment will aid or improve recovery of the work injury. The principle has been recognized since 1966.

In Jordan v. Fla. Industrial Commission, 183 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1966), the Florida Supreme Court reversed the rulings of two lower tribunals which denied treatment of a pre-existing deformity, and compensation for healing time during and following same. The injured worker in the case had sustained a leg injury in a prior accident which healed at an abnormal angle shortening his leg by two and one-fourth inches, giving him a limp, curvature of the spine and abnormal stress on the leg muscles, tendons, etc. Four years later he suffered a job-connected accident resulting in a back injury. Medical testimony demonstrated that were it not for the abnormal stress on his back caused by the earlier deformity, claimant’s back would have healed from the compensable injury in four to eight weeks, and that the only effective treatment for the compensable back injury was to correct the leg length discrepancy. The Judge of Compensation Claims declined to require that the employer provide treatment or appliances to correct the deformity. The Full Industrial Commission affirmed the JCC. (It should be noted that the Industrial Commission no longer exists to review workers’ compensation trial judge rulings. That responsibility now lies with the First District Court of Appeal.) The Supreme Court  reversed both tribunals and ordered E/C to furnish the medical treatment.

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court-gavelIn just about every personal injury and workers’ compensation case, the defense will seek the production of records from non-parties to the suit. The typical non-party targets are medical providers and insurance companies. In most instances, the records sought were not generated in connection with the subject case. The defense is looking for records of preexisting medical conditions and prior legal claims.

Florida’s discovery rules are liberal. FRCP 1.280(b) provides as follows:

(b) Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery isas follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Albeit broad, the rules are not boundless. In Russell v. Stardust Cruisers, Inc., 690 So.2d 743 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), a wrongful death case, petitioner objected to defendant’s request for decedent’s psychiatric and psychological records, stating that the medical records were confidential and that the request was overbroad. The DCA decided that the records might be relevant to the issue of damages but disagreed with the court’s order allowing “carte blanche investigation of decedent’s entire mental health history.” Russell at 745. The court explained that “Even though the rules of civil procedure allow for broad discovery, the discovery must be confined to matters admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence in the case.” Russell at 745, citing East Colonial Refuse Service, Inc. v. Velocci, 416 So.2d 1276, 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). The trial court order allowing carte blanche discovery was quashed and the matter was remanded for an in camera review of the records.

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