jcc Tag Archives — Florida Injury Attorney Blawg

July 26, 2023

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Medical Expenses Incurred in Diagnosing the Nature and Cause of Non-Compensable Injuries Can be the Responsibility of Workers’ Compensation Insurance Carriers

We represent a woman who fell at work. The employer sent her to a clinic the same day for treatment. However, because of miscommunications between the employer and the clinic, she never got in to see a doctor despite waiting more than two hours. While in the waiting room, our client began experiencing stroke-like symptoms. She phoned her daughter to take her to the hospital. She was admitted to the hospital and underwent a series of tests mostly aimed at the stroke-like symptoms. She was discharged 24 hours after being admitted. The hospital bill was close to $100,000.

Our client injured her back and feet in the fall. She did not strike her head. The workers’ compensation insurance carrier has accepted responsibility for the orthopedic injuries. However, it is not considering paying the hospital bill. It may have to pay the bill.

It is well established in the case law that diagnostic testing is always compensable if the purpose is to find out the cause of the injured worker’s symptoms. See Arnau v. Winn Dixie Stores, 105 So.3d 669, 671 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) citing Nealy v. City of W. Palm Beach, 491 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“Whenever the purpose of the diagnostic test is to determine the cause of a claimant’s symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident, the cost of the diagnostic test is compensable.”); see also Superior Concrete Constr. v. Olsen, 616 So.2d 183, 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Perry v. Ridgecrest Int’l, 548 So.2d 826, 827-28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). This is true even if the tests prove the symptoms are unrelated to the compensable injury. Nealy, 491 So.2d at 586.

The foundation for these principles is found in Florida statute 440.13. Under paragraph 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2023), employers are required to furnish “such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance for such period as the nature of the injury or process of recovery may require.” Medically necessary treatment includes “any medical service or medical supply which is used to identify or treat an illness or injury.” § 440.13(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2023).

May 16, 2023

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Limited Medical Choices for Claimants in Florida Workers’ Compensation Cases

by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.

Florida Statute 440.13 governs the provision of medical care under Florida’s workers’ compensation system. For the most part, the Employer and its insurance carrier — “E/C” — control the provision of medical care.

The most dominant aspect of this control is the right to select the injured worker’s treating doctors. Unfortunately, most of these doctors suffer from the incurable “Don’t Bite the Hand that Feeds You” disease. All too frequently, the opinions expressed by these doctors benefit the E/C to the detriment of the Claimant.

On rare occasions, E/C loses control of the medical. The most frequent situation is where the worker has suffered substantial injuries requiring emergency surgery in the hospital. The natural sequence is that the surgeon, especially if he or she maintains a private practice, will remain the primary physician after the patient is discharged from the hospital. While this doctor is not hand-picked by E/C, he or she is also not hand-picked by the Claimant.

440.13(2)(c) gives E/C a “reasonable time period” to provide initial medical treatment and care. If E/C fails to provide the initial treatment and care, Claimant “may obtain such initial treatment at the expense of the employer.” Even still, E/C can regain control of the medical under this provision. In Carmack v. Department of Agriculture, 31 So.3d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), Claimant suffered a compensable accident, but E/C refused to authorize medical care for psychiatric issues arising from leg and back injuries. Claimant sought care with a psychiatrist and filed a Petition for Benefits seeking authorization of past and future care with the psychiatrist. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) ordered E/C to pay for treatment through the date of the final hearing (workers’ compensation trial), but not for continuing treatment with the particular doctor. Instead, E/C was able to choose another psychiatrist. The JCC’s ruling was upheld on appeal.

November 20, 2022

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Florida’s EMA Law Neuters the Independence of Workers’ Compensation Judges

by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.

The resolution of disputes in Florida workers’ compensation cases often boils down to medical opinions. On this matter, the deck is stacked against injured workers (a/k/a “claimants”).

Section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes lays out the obligations of employers and their insurance carriers, commonly referred to as “E/C,” to furnish medical care to injured workers. Unless an E/C fails to furnish care timely, it controls who is authorized to provide care at every stage of the case. 440.13(2)(a),(c)&(f). In other words, E/C get to pick claimants’ medical providers.

We typically see the same handful of medical providers selected by E/C in every case. The obvious reason why is because the providers make a steady and reliable income from workers’ compensation cases and know better than to bite the hand that feeds them. Especially when a call can go either way, they are skilled at expressing opinions favorable to E/C. They’re also adept at managing care so they make money, for example, with ongoing visits and physical therapy, while depriving claimants of the opportunity to recover lost wage payments. In this regard, “No functional limitations” is a favorite conclusion. See Section 21 of DWC-25. (This form is supposed to be completed by authorized doctors after every appointment.)

Making matters worse is that judges of workers’ compensation claims (“JCC) are not allowed to consider the opinions of any medical providers other than those authorized by E/C, typically the hand-selected usual suspects, each party’s IME, and an EMA doctor. Section 440.13(5)(e) provides as follows:

No medical opinion other than the opinion of a medical advisor appointed by the judge of compensation claims or the department, an independent medical examiner, or an authorized treating provider is admissible in proceedings before the judges of compensation claims.

An IME doctor is not a treater. He or she gets to examine the claimant one time and review medical records. See 440.13(1)(h)&(i) and (5). The EMA doctor is appointed by the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) to resolve differences of opinion among authorized and IME doctors. Section 440.13(9), Florida Statutes.

November 8, 2022

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Peer Review in Florida Workers’ Compensation

by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.

The Oxford Dictionary defines peer review as “a judgment on a piece of scientific or other professional work by others working in the same area.” It is a commonly used procedure with a variety of scientific and medical matters.

Florida’s workers’ compensation statutes are located in Chapter 440. Peer review is referenced at section 440.13(1)(o) as follows:

“Peer review” means an evaluation by two or more physicians licensed under the same authority and with the same or similar specialty as the physician under review, of the appropriateness, quality, and cost of health care and health services provided to a patient, based on medically accepted standards.

There is little other jurisprudential instruction to explain the pertinence of peer review in workers’ compensation cases.

Last week I received a “Peer Review” report from a doctor hired by the workers’ compensation insurance company in one of our cases. In the doctor’s opinion, a shoulder surgery recommended by our client’s authorized doctor “does not meet established treatment standards of medical necessity.” The peer review report was generated in response to a Petition for Benefits we had filed seeking authorization of the surgery. A few days later the workers’ compensation carrier filed a formal response to the Petition for Benefits in which it agreed to authorize the surgery. This is not the first time I’ve experienced a similar about-face involving peer review.

I don’t know why the carrier went to the trouble and expense of this so-called peer review. First, the statute requires the review to be done by “two or more physicians.” This review was done by one physician. Next, while 440.13(r) and (s) express an interest in “Utilization control” and “Utilization review,” neither the statute nor case law instruct how or even whether peer review functions to address utilization concerns or disputed medical benefits.