Pie-Chart-300x246Not infrequently, both a workers’ compensation case and a personal injury liability case will arise from the same accident. For example, a construction site supervisor involved in a motor vehicle crash while traveling to Home Depot for supplies can pursue workers’ compensation benefits from the employer and civil liability damages from the at-fault party.

Florida Statute 440.39(2) provides that “the employer or, in the event the employer is insured against liability hereunder, the insurer shall be subrogated to the rights of the employee or his or her dependents against such third-party tortfeasor.” This means that the employer and its workers’ compensation insurance carrier are entitled to recover a portion of their expenditures from money the injured employee receives from the at-fault third party.

Typically, it is not a dollar-for-dollar recovery. The formula for the recovery is contained in section 440.39(3)(a).

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scales-of-justice-300x203We just received a telephone call from a heartbroken mother whose 47-year old daughter died a few years ago after falling into a diabetic coma. A well-being, or safety check, call was made to the local police department a day after the young woman phoned to inform her employer that she wasn’t feeling well. A law enforcement officer went to her home that day, but her parents believe that the officer failed to take appropriate actions as her car was in the driveway and the windows of her home were open even though it was raining. The officer did not make contact with the woman or attempt to go into the home. She was found deceased in her home two days later. The mother believes her daughter was incapacitated but alive at the time of the safety call and could have been rescued if she had been discovered then and emergency care rendered.

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surgeon-3-391477-mI have railed for years against various aspects of Florida’s workers’ compensation system. One of my main targets has been section 440.13(9)(c), Florida Statutes, covered under the section of the statute dealing with “Expert Medical Advisors.” What bothered me about the law is that it excluded workers’ compensation judges, known as judges of compensation claims (JCC), from being able to perform an important job function.

Before the 2023 Florida legislative session, when there was a “disagreement in the opinions of the health care providers, if two health care providers disagree on medical evidence supporting the employee’s complaints or the need for additional medical treatment, or if two health care providers disagree that the employee is able to return to work,” the JCC was mandated by 440.13(9)(c) to order the injured employee to be evaluated by an expert medical advisor whose opinion was presumed to be correct unless clear and convincing evidence demonstrated otherwise. Rarely did a JCC rule against the presumption.

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greed2Florida law authorizes employers and their workers’ compensation insurance carriers (“E/C”) to choose every one of an injured worker’s treating doctors. See, sections 440.13(2)(a) & (f), Florida Statutes. They pick medical providers, sometimes called “The Usual Suspects,” from whom they can expect to receive favorable opinions. Because the doctors like the steady and easy income, they play along. So much for honoring the Hippocratic Oath.

To receive workers’ compensation wage loss benefits, also known as indemnity benefits (see, sections 440.13(2)&(4), Florida Statutes), the burden is on the injured worker (a/k/a, Claimant) to establish a connection between the work-related injuries and any wage loss. In 2024, the weekly wage loss benefit can be as much as $1,260.

Medical providers authorized by the E/C are required to complete form DWC-25 after each appointment. Section IV of the form addresses the injured worker’s “Functional Limitations and Restrictions.” It contains three paragraphs (numbers 21, 22, and 23) for this purpose with corresponding boxes for the provider to check. Paragraph 21 indicates that the Claimant does not have any functional limitations. Paragraph 22 provides that the Claimant’s injuries are of such severity he cannot work. Paragraph 23 says that the Claimant can work with restrictions.

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motorwayFor the eighth year in a row, the Florida Legislature has considered but failed to make bodily injury (BI) insurance coverage mandatory for every owner or operator of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state. The two bills proposed for this reason during the recently concluded legislative session failed to receive a committee hearing.

Florida and New Hampshire are the only two states in the Union that do not require all drivers to carry BI coverage.

What Florida does require is personal injury protection or PIP and property damage (PD) liability coverage in the amount of $10,000 because of damage or destruction to the property of others in a crash.

Three years ago, Florida’s Legislature passed a bipartisan bill that would have required BI coverage. Pressured by the insurance industry, Gov. Ron DeSantis vetoed the bill. This year’s proposed bills addressed some of the concerns expressed by Gov. DeSantis when he vetoed the bill. Nevertheless, the insurance industry kept the bills from gaining traction.

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L1001863-300x200We have a case in the office where our client, an injured worker, is being denied temporary partial disabililty (TPD/440.15(4)) benefits based on two defenses. The defenses, voluntary limitation of income and termination for cause, are at odds with one another.

Voluntary Limitation of Income Defense

Our client was fired from her job. She did not resign or refuse employment. In Carcamo v. Business Representation Internation & North River Ins. Co., 37 So. 3d 901 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), the injured worker voluntarily resigned from suitable employment. The employer/carrier (E/C) denied her claim for TPD benefits. The judge of compensation claims (JCC) sided with E/C. The First DCA disagreed with the JCC and remanded the case for further factual findings.

The appellate court pointed out that a voluntary resignation does not alone support the denial of TPD benefits. Carcamo at 901. What must be taken into account is whether the claimant’s refusal was justifiable, section 440.15(6), Florida Statutes, and the continued availability of the job. See Moore v. Servicemaster Commercial Servs., 19 So.3d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (although employer not required to continually reoffer job to avail itself of statutory defenses based on unjustified voluntary limitation of income, employer must establish continued availability of job for each applicable period to obtain continued benefit of defense).

Our client, a single mother with sole custody of a young child, sustained a significant injury that required extensive surgical repair. After a lengthy recovery period, she was offered light duty work by the same employer. At the time of the job offer, our client and her daughter were living at her mother’s home in Georgia. Due to logistical issues, our client, who otherwise had an exemplary work history, showed up for work one week late. She was fired a few days later. She has not been contacted since by the employer to return to work.

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scales-of-justice-300x203This blog is the second on recent efforts by Republican legislators with the consequence of making Florida’s roads and highways more dangerous. (The first blog: Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Republican Legislators Work to Make Florida’s Roadways Less Safe.)

Section 768.28(5)(a), Florida Statutes limits the recovery against the state and its agencies and subdivisions for tort lawsuits to $200,000 per individual claim and $300,000 total for all claims arising out of the same incident or occurrence.

No matter how catastrophic and life-altering the injuries may be or whether death results from the negligence of the sovereign, this is the hard cap.
It does not matter what a judge or jury decides regarding the extent of the damages.

Section 768.28(5)(a) is the outgrowth of section 768.28(1), which is a limited waiver by the state of the doctrine commonly referred to as “Sovereign Immunity.” The doctrine is derived from English common law under which the King could not be sued on the theories that he could do no wrong, and that there could be no legal rights against the authority that makes the laws upon which the rights depend. See Miles McCann, Visiting Fellow, National Association of Attorneys General, State Sovereign Immunity, Nov. 11, 2017, https://www.naag.org/attorney-general-journal/state-sovereign-immunity/(last visited Jan. 23, 2024).

In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the doctrine was adopted by our country’s Founders in the Constitution itself rather than the Eleventh Amendment, solidifying its place in American jurisprudence. The doctrine is available to the federal government and every state.

Not every state chooses to hide behind sovereign immunity. California and New York, states with large populations and high costs of living and medical care like Florida, have no caps on suits against their state and local governments. Among the states using cap limits, Florida’s numbers are some of the lowest, making them a mere slap on the wrist to wrongdoers and failing to encourage safer practices and procedures.

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scales-of-justice-300x203Since 1990, Florida has maintained a statute that has come to be commonly referred to as the “Free Kill” law.  The statute, section 768.21(8), is located in the damages portion of the Wrongful Death Act.

The legislative intent of the Wrongful Death Act is set forth in section 768.17:

It is the public policy of the state to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs from the survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer.

From motor vehicle crashes, construction accidents, defective products, and even medical negligence, wrongful death is caused in countless ways. The Wrongful Death Act allows the survivors of the decedent to recover from the wrongdoer once fault is established. Included within these remedies is the right to recover for mental pain and suffering. 768.21(8) is the exception to the rule.

Under 768.21(8), when a death is caused by medical negligence, mental pain and suffering damages (known as non-economic losses) are not recoverable by a parent for the loss of an adult child or by an adult child for the loss of a parent.  768.18(2) provides that a child 25 years of age or older is an adult child under the Act.

Yes, you read that right. Hence, the reason why 768.21(8) has come to be known as the “Free Kill” law.

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motorway“Sine die,” the dropping of the handkerchief ceremony to signal the end of the legislative session in Florida, could not come soon enough this year for residents hoping for safer roads and highways.

During the 2024 legislative session, which ran from January 9, 2024 to March 8, 2024, Republican legislators proposed a variety of bills that would insulate trucking companies, road contractors, engineers and other contractors from liability when they make Florida’s roadways more dangerous.

Commercial Vehicles

Penske Corporation, Inc., one of the largest trucking rental companies in the nation, backed legislation that would give vehicle owners, lessors, and operators immunity from liability when those vehicles were not equipped to meet industry safety standards. Florida is not the only state targeted for similar legislation.

Industry safety standards are developed from the practice of customary methods and conduct over time. In many instances, the standards are codified in statutes, regulations, and industry publications, while experts in various fields often testify based on their experience and knowledge. Evidence of violation of industry standards is admissible as non-conclusive evidence of negligence. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v. White, 369 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). See also: St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v. Burlison, 262 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Clements v. Boca Aviation, Inc., 444 So.2d 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Nance v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 436 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983); Reese v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, 360 So.2d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).

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sidewalk-300x200Owners and occupiers of premises have a duty to warn invitees (e.g., shoppers in mall, residents of condominium) of latent or concealed perils of which they know or should know. Krol v. City of Orlando, 778 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

Conditions such as uneven floor levels and sidewalk curbs have been found by Florida courts to be open and obvious. E.g., Bowles v. Elkes Pontiac Co., 63 So. 2d 769, 772 (Fla. 1952) (concluding that uneven floor levels in public places do not constitute latent, hidden, and dangerous conditions); Gorin v. City of St. Augustine, 595 So. 2d 1062, 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (concluding that sidewalk curb used as platform to pick up and drop off passengers riding a tram is not hidden dangerous condition); Aventura Mall Venture v. Olson, 561 So. 2d 319, 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (finding that six-inch sidewalk curb located at a mall is not “concealed or latent danger”).

The obvious danger doctrine recognizes that owners and occupiers should be legally permitted to assume that an invitee will perceive that which would be obvious upon the ordinary use of their senses. See Circle K Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Ferguson, 556 So. 2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). This doctrine is counterbalanced by the principle that a landowner’s duty to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition is not discharged by the dangerous condition being open and obvious. De Cruz-Haymer v. Festival Food Mkt., Inc., 117 So.3d 885, 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

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