Civil Litigation

June 12, 2025

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Mental and Nervous Injuries Under Florida Law: The Impact Rule and Workers’ Compensation

Florida’s liability and workers’ compensation systems take a cautious approach when it comes to awarding benefits for mental and emotional injuries. This caution stems from a fundamental public policy concern: without clear limits, allowing recovery for purely emotional harm could lead to a flood of speculative or fabricated claims. As the Florida Supreme Court explained in R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 652 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1995), this concern is central to the application of what’s known as the “Impact Rule.”

What Is the Impact Rule?

Under the Impact Rule, a plaintiff cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused by another’s negligence unless the emotional distress arises from physical injuries sustained during a physical impact. This requirement is firmly rooted in Florida case law. See Southern Baptist Hosp. of Fla. v. Welker, 908 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2005).

The rule applies to both common law personal injury claims and statutory workers’ compensation claims. It sets a high bar for plaintiffs and claimants seeking compensation for psychological harm, requiring a demonstrable link to physical trauma.

June 11, 2025

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Understanding Florida’s Rear-End Collision Presumption

by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.

In 1958, Florida joined a small number of states in adopting a legal presumption of negligence against trailing drivers involved in rear-end motor vehicle collisions. This shift was established in McNulty v. Cusack, 104 So.2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958), and later endorsed by the Florida Supreme Court in Bellere v. Madsen, 114 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1959).

The Legal Rationale

The presumption is rooted in practical evidentiary concerns. Typically, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving all four elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. But in rear-end crashes, plaintiffs often know they were hit from behind but have no access to the circumstances leading up to the impact—leaving gaps in proof for breach and causation.

To address this, Florida courts created a rebuttable presumption: if a rear-end collision occurs, the trailing driver is presumed negligent. This shifts the burden of production to the defendant, who must offer a “substantial and reasonable explanation” to overcome the presumption. If successful, the case proceeds to the jury without the benefit of the presumption. See Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So.2d 26, 28–29 (Fla. 1965); Brethauer v. Brassell, 347 So.2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).

Originally developed during Florida’s contributory negligence era—where any negligence on the plaintiff’s part barred recovery—the rule had significant weight. Under today’s comparative fault framework, however, negligence is apportioned, and partial fault does not automatically defeat a claim. See Shayne v. Saunders, 176 So. 495 (Fla. 1937); Stephens v. Dichtenmueller, 207 So.2d 718 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), quashed on other grounds.

June 10, 2025

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Florida’s “Free Kill” Law: A Legal Loophole That Still Denies Grieving Families Justice

by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.

Since 1990, Florida has enforced a statute commonly referred to as the “Free Kill” law. Codified at Section 768.21(8) of the Florida Wrongful Death Act, this provision creates a glaring exception in an otherwise remedial framework intended to support grieving families.

The legislative intent behind the Wrongful Death Act, as stated in Section 768.17, is clear:

“It is the public policy of the state to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs from the survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer.”

From car crashes and construction accidents to defective products and medical malpractice, wrongful death claims arise in countless tragic ways. When negligence causes a death, Florida law generally allows surviving family members to recover damages — including for mental pain and suffering, often the most devastating aspect of such a loss.

But Section 768.21(8) carves out a critical exception: If the death is caused by medical negligence, parents of adult children (defined under Section 768.18(2) as those age 25 or older) and adult children of deceased parents are barred from recovering non-economic damages — no compensation for grief, anguish, or loss of companionship.

Yes, you read that correctly. If a doctor’s negligence kills your elderly parent or your adult child, Florida law says you’re entitled to nothing for your emotional loss. That’s why Section 768.21(8) has earned the nickname: “The Free Kill Law.”

The Insurance Myth

Proponents of the law claim it helps keep medical malpractice insurance rates down. But studies have not substantiated those claims. In fact, in McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014), the Florida Supreme Court struck down arbitrary damage caps in medical malpractice cases, finding they violated equal protection. The Court specifically rejected the idea that such caps meaningfully reduce insurance premiums or promote physician retention.

June 10, 2025

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. /// Reimbursement Rights of Health and Disability Insurers in Florida Personal Injury Cases

by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.

It is common for health and disability (lost wages) insurance carriers to pay benefits to their insureds who are injured due to someone else’s negligence. Many of these policies include reimbursement provisions allowing the insurer to recover payments from any personal injury settlement or judgment obtained by the insured.

How Much Must Be Repaid?

The reimbursement amount depends on two key factors:

Policy Language
The Source of the Settlement or Judgment

Most policies state that the insurer is entitled to full reimbursement from the insured’s recovery—often before the insured or their attorney receives anything. However, when the recovery is from a tortfeasor (the at-fault party), Florida law may limit the insurer’s rights.

April 30, 2025

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. /// Uber Drivers and Passengers, Beware!

by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.

Much has been written about the type of insurance coverage available to Uber passengers and other third parties for accidents caused by Uber drivers. Less has been written about the coverage available to Uber drivers and their passengers for injuries caused by third parties such as other drivers.

Currently, we are handling a case for an Uber driver who was hurt through the negligence of another driver. Our client’s passenger was also hurt.

Florida motor vehicle insurance policies offer a variety of coverages. For individuals, only Property Damage Liability and PIP are mandatory. The other available coverages are Uninsured Motorist/Underinsured Motorist (UM/UIM), Comprehensive, Collision, and Medical Payments. A premium is charged for each type of coverage.

Uber maintains insurance coverage in Florida with Progressive. We received a copy of the policy applicable to our accident. The available coverages are:

Liability to Others – Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability – $1,000,000 combined single limit
Comprehensive – $2,500
Collision – $2,500
Medical Payments – $5,000 each person

Uber rejected UM/UIM. PIP was not an option.

April 18, 2025

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. /// Premises Liability: Landlord’s Post-possession Duty to Repair Dangerous Defective Conditions

by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.

Our law firm receives a steady stream of inquiries from tenants, mostly residential, regarding dangerous conditions inside of their units. If someone has been injured, we ask if the landlord or maintenance company had notice of the dangerous condition in advance of the incident. If nobody has yet been injured, we instruct the callers to notify their landlord and maintenance company in writing (email will do).

The reason for this is because landlords and maintenance companies have a continuing duty to repair dangerous conditions upon notice of their existence, unless waived by the tenant. Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328, 1330 (Fla. 1981 and § 83.51(1), Fla. Stat. (2021).

March 18, 2025

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. /// Practice Pointer: Keep Your Eye On the Ball

by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.

Everyone is familiar with the idiom, “Keep your eye on the ball.” What it means, quite simply, is to keep one’s attention focused on the matter at hand. Lawyers must remember this during intense situations.

Last week we experienced just such an intense situation. In a case involving severe personal injuries sustained by our client, we attended a hearing on the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The corporate defendant was asking the court to enter a judgment that it was not vicariously liable for the negligence of its agent. In other words, Defendant was asking the court to throw out the case against it. Serious stuff.

Defendant’s motion was brought under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, which reads in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment. A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (bold added for emphasis).

The burden is on the moving party (in our case, the Defendant) to demonstrate the absence of genuine material facts, that no material issues remain for trial, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(a). “An issue is genuine if ‘a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party,’ and ‘[a] fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” Birren v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD, 2022 WL 657626, at *2 (S.D. Fla. March 4, 2022), quoting, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11^th Cir. 2008) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 22, 247-48 (1986).

January 16, 2025

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. /// Don’t Underestimate the Potency of Florida Workers’ Compensation Statute 440.39

by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.

It is not uncommon for a personal injury case and a workers’ compensation case to arise out of the same accident. This is often the case when an employee is hurt in the course and scope of his job through the negligence of a third-party. Our law firm handles both types of cases.

Florida Statute 440.39 gives the employer or its workers’ compensation insurance carrier, as the case may be, lien rights in the proceeds of any recovery made in the personal injury liability case. In consideration of this right, the employer and carrier have a “duty to cooperate” with the employee in prosecuting claims and potential claims against third-party tortfeasors. See sec. 440.39(7).

The court in Shaw v. Cambridge Integrated Servs. Group, Inc., 888 So.2d 58, 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), declared that the duty to cooperate found in section 440.39(7) is “[o]ne of the most important rules and conditions stated in the Workers Compensation statute.” For example, an employer/carrier’s failure to cooperate can have adverse consequences on their lien rights. 440.39(3)(a) provides that

the failure by the employer or carrier to comply with the duty to cooperate imposed by subsection (7) may be taken into account by the trial court in determining the amount of the employer’s or carrier’s recovery, and such recovery may be reduced, as the court deems equitable and appropriate under the circumstances, including as a mitigating factor whether a claim or potential claim against a third party is likely to impose liability upon the party whose cooperation is sought, if it finds such a failure has occurred.

A violation of 440.39 can also subject the employer/carrier to a spoliation claim for failing to preserve evidence. This cause of action is not barred by the employer’s workers’ compensation immunity outlined in section 440.11, Florida Statutes. See General Cinema Beverages of Miami v. Mortimer, 689 So.2d 276, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

October 29, 2024

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. /// Spouse Married Post-Accident Entitled to Florida Wrongful Death Damages

by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.

In Ripple v. CBS Corp., 385 So.3d 1021 (Fla. 2024), the Florida Supreme Court held that a spouse who married the decedent after the onset of the injury that caused the decedent’s death can recover damages as a “surviving spouse” under section 768.21(2) of the Florida Wrongful Death Act (the Act). That provision allows a “surviving spouse” to recover “for loss of the decedent’s companionship and protection and for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.”

Relying on statutory interpretation, the Court rejected the argument that the common law “marriage before injury” rule bars recovery under section 768.21(2). The “marriage before injury” rule is limited to personal injury claims. It provides that where a couple is not married before the injury occurred, no consortium damages are available. See, e.g., Tremblay v. Carter, 390 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1980).

August 28, 2024

Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Releasing Active Tortfeasors Does Not Release Vicariously Liable Tortfeasors

by Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A.

Active tortfeasors become legally liable for engaging in negligent conduct. Passive tortfeasors become liable for the negligent conduct of active tortfeasors through the legal principle known as vicarious liability. Examples include owners of motor vehicles whose permissive drivers cause crashes and employers for the acts of their employees.

Nowadays, active tortfeasors can be released from cases, even before a lawsuit is brought, without sacrificing the case against the passive tortfeasors. It wasn’t always this way in Florida.

Common law used to reason that settling with the active tortfeasor discharged the liability of the passive tortfeasor. “At common law and before the enactment of statutes to the contrary, a release of one joint tortfeasor released the other, Louisville & N.R.R. v. Allen, 67 Fla. 257, 65 So. 8 (1914).” Safecare Health Corp. v. Rimer, 620 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla. 1993)(McDonald, J. dissenting).

In modern times, at least, the Florida Legislature has, for the most part, not been friendly to Plaintiffs. It has crafted statutes making it harder to gain access to the courthouse and to obtain just compensation for serious injuries once inside. An exception to this history concerns statutory changes that paved the way to the present state of the law regarding settlements with active tortfeasors.

The first statutory change was enacted in 1957. It provided that

A release or covenant not to sue as to one tort-feasor for property damage to, personal injury of, or the wrongful death of any person shall not operate to release or discharge the liability of any other tort-feasor who may be liable for the same tort or death.

In Hertz Corp. v Hellens, 140 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), the court interpreted the statute as applying “to all tort-feasors, whether joint or several, including vicarious tortfeasors.”

Subsequent Florida statutes — 46.015, 768.041, and 768.31 — and case law — e.g., Stephen Bodzo Realty, Inc. v. Willits International Corp., 428 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1983), Florida TomatoPackers, Inc. v. Wilson, 296 So. 2d 536, 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), JFK Medical Center, Inc. v. Price, 647 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1994), Crosby v. Jones, 705 So. 2d 1356, (Fla. 1998) — have brought us to the present state where it is safe to settle with, and dismiss, actively liable tortfeasors. However, while this may be true, caution must still be exercised with the settlement release.

First and foremost, avoid any language that could be construed as releasing other defendants, including vicariously liable tortfeasors. As further protection, add language to the release making it clear that it does not apply to any other defendants including but not limited to vicariously liable defendants.

Advantages of settling with the active tortfeasor include gaining access to funds and, in some instances, getting the active tortfeasor to feel friendlier to the plaintiff’s side.