surgeon-3-391477-m.jpgHerniated intervertebral discs can have significant medical and legal consequences. The symptoms of a herniated disc can range from minor pain all the way up to unbearable, unremitting pain, paresthesia, and numbness. Treatment options include palliative medicine, physical therapy, epidural injections, and surgery. Each of these option can be costly and none is guaranteed effective. A herniated disc can also limit one’s ability to work.

Discs herniate through degeneration, a lengthy process, and acute trauma. A disc compromised by degeneration is more likely to herniate from trauma than one that is not. The personal injury and workers’ compensation legal systems do not compensate for herniations caused by degeneration only. They are supposed to compensate for herniations caused solely by trauma, and will sometimes compensate for herniations superimposed on degeneration, referred to as an aggravation of a preexisting condition. (For an understanding of how the two systems handle aggravation injuries, consider Florida Standard Jury Instruction 501.5a, for civil cases, and this article, for workers’ compensation.

In civil cases, a defendant responsible for causing a herniated disc can be liable in damages which include medical expenses, lost wages (past and future), and pain & suffering (also known as non-economic damages). In workers’ compensation, the employer/carrier can be liable for medical expenses and lost wages; compensation for pain & suffering is not available in the workers’ compensation system.

The costs associated with a herniated disc can be significant, even in the hundreds of thousands where a spinal fusion is involved. As a result, civil defendants and workers’ compensation employers/carriers fight to limit their financial exposure.

A common defense method is to use doctors who will testify to one or more of the following:

  • There isn’t a herniation
  • If there is a herniation, it was not caused by the accident (e.g., it preexisted the accident)
  • The herniation is asymptomatic or not causing the level of pain being complained of by the Plaintiff/Claimant
  • The various treatment options, including surgery, are not indicated now or in the future
  • The herniation should not prevent the Plaintiff/Claimant from working full duty

The defense doctor’s testimony must be challenged. As with the questioning of any expert under oath, the most important rule is to be prepared. For me, at least, that means going over the doctor’s report with a fine tooth comb for weaknesses and inconsistencies, keeping in mind that what isn’t said is often as telling as what is said. At the beginning, I may feel stumped. However, with enough thought, even of the subconscious type, something always comes to mind. This is why I like to begin the process well in advance of the interrogation. Digesting and mulling works wonders.
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puzzle2.jpgUnderstanding Florida motor vehicle insurance law can be puzzling. The various coverage options include Personal Injury Protection (PIP), Bodily Injury (BI), Comprehensive/Collision, Property Damage Liability, and Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist (UM/UIM). Presently, only PIP and Property Damage Liability are mandatory in Florida. Neither of these coverages compensates the victim of an accident for non-economic damages like pain and suffering arising from a bad injury. Only two of the coverages do: BI and UM.

UM is typically thought of as coverage purchased for the benefit of the named insured or insureds and resident relatives (see definition at Florida Statute 627.732(6)). It takes the place of BI where BI is not available (UM) or not adequate (UIM) because the loss exceeds available coverage limits. UM/UIM are not thought of as providing coverage to those other than named insureds and resident relatives. This thinking is incorrect.
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laptop-work-1260785-m.jpgParties to legal actions should always assume that their social media (e.g., Facebook; Twitter) postings will be discovered (discovery is allowed by FRCP 1.350; Discovery of Facebook Content in Florida Cases, 31 No. 2 Trial Advoc. Q 14 (Spring 2012)) and used against them by the other side if helpful. Postings can be used to contradict assertions made in a legal case and sometimes lead to the outright dismissal of actions by the court based on fraud.

However, hurdles must be overcome to get postings into evidence. Among the hurdles:

Finding and Preserving the Social Media Evidence

  • Once we find useful postings by surfing the Internet, we save link addresses, print pages, and take iPad screen shots by simultaneously pressing both of the device’s power switches.
  • Preservation of evidence letters can also be sent to those who own and or control the site to prevent spoilation of the evidence through the innocent or purposeful removal of content. Surprisingly, parties are not obligated to preserve evidence without a specific request. See, Osmulski v. Oldsmar Fine Wine, Inc., So.3d , 37 FLW D1578 (Fla. 2nd DCA 6-20-2012).
  • Formal discovery, pursuant to FRCP 1.310, 1.340, and 1.350, can be used to identify websites with potentially valuable information. Request from the respondent: websites the respondent uses to communicate with others; website account information such as account holder and user name; respondent’s email addresses, phone number, home address; printouts of account information and screen shots.
  • Subpoenas can also be issued to website administrators, like Facebook and Twitter. (The particular knotty issues involved in gathering information from administrators is beyond the scope of this blog.)
  • Another source of information is the Wayback Machine. This is a service that allows people to surf more than 150 billion pages in the Internet Archive’s Web archive.

Legal Hurdles
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greed2.jpgFlorida workers severely injured at work sometimes qualify for both workers’ compensation permanent total disability benefits (PTD) (F.S. 440.15(1)) and social security disability benefits (SSD) (42 U.S.C. s. 423).

The Florida workers’ compensation system, codified in Chapter 440 of Florida’s statutes, sets forth the responsibilities of employers and their workers’ compensation insurance companies (E/C) to injured workers. Workers whose injuries permanently prevent them from being gainfully employed are entitled to receive 66-2/3% of their average weekly wage (AWW) (440.14) from employers/carriers until age 75. These same individuals sometimes also qualify for SSD, which includes a monthly payment, when they are similarly permanently unable to work. (SSD converts to Social Security Retirement benefits at full retirement age — 66 if born after 1942, 67 if born after 1960.) SSD is paid by taxpayers.
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law books.jpgFlorida entities seek advance protection from their own negligence in two ways: exculpatory clauses and indemnity agreements.

An exculpatory clause purports to deny an injured party the right to recover damages from a person negligently causing his injury. Kitchens of the Oceans, Inc. v. McGladrey & Pullen LLP, 832 So.2d 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

An indemnity agreement arises when one individual takes on the obligation to pay for any liability, loss or damage that has been or might be incurred by another individual. Free Legal Dictionary. Some indemnity agreements purport to indemnify a party against its own wrongful acts.

Exculpatory clauses and indemnity agreements which attempt to indemnify a party against its own wrongful acts are viewed with disfavor in Florida. Since both are looked upon with disfavor by the courts, they are enforceable only where and to the extent that the intention to be relieved from liability was made clear and unequivocal and the wording must be so clear and understandable that an ordinary and knowledgeable person will know what is at stake. Exculpatory clauses: Gayon v. Bally’s Total Fitness Corp., 802 So.2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Raveson v. Walt Disney World Co., 793 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Indemnity agreements: Cox Cable v. Gulf Power, 591 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1992); Charles Poe Masonry, Inc. v. Spring Lock Scaffolding, 374 So.2d 487 (1979); University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart, 272 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1973); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Elmore, 189 So.2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); and Nat Harrison Associates, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 162 So.2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964).

Our law firm is currently in the early stages of a case involving personal injuries and an indemnity agreement, but no exculpatory clause. Our catastrophically injured client was an independent contractor pulling large trailers owned by a Florida company. He was injured through the negligent maintenance of the trailer by the Florida company. He and the company have in place an agreement calling for our client to indemnify the company for injuries resulting from its fault.

The legal question is whether the indemnity agreement effectively precludes our client from recovering for his losses from the company. We believe that the answer is No. In our considered opinion, it would take an exculpatory clause, rather than an indemnity agreement, to deny our client the right to recover damages from the company for negligently causing his injuries.
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applicationWhenever an insured makes a claim, one of the first things every insurance company does is try to figure out ways to deny the claim. Common methods are to assert that the loss is not covered under the policy or that the insured has failed to cooperate with the carrier. Another popular practice is to rescind the insurance contract based on charges of misrepresentation, omission, concealment of fact or incorrect statement in an application for insurance. This method is authorized by Section 627.409(1) of the Florida Statutes, and can even be based on non-intentional misstatements.

While the law does not favor the forfeiture of rights under an insurance policy, see Johnson v. Life Insurance Company of Georgia, 52 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1951), beating back 627.409 charges can be difficult. To prevail under 627.409, the carrier need only show any of the following:

(a) The misrepresentation, omission, concealment, or statement is fraudulent or is material either to the acceptance of the risk or to the hazard assumed by the insurer.

(b) If the true facts had been known to the insurer pursuant to a policy requirement or other requirement, the insurer in good faith would not have issued the policy or contract, would not have issued it at the same premium rate, would not have issued a policy or contract in as large an amount, or would not have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss.

These are not especially difficult standards for carriers to meet. Moreover, while carriers sometimes prey on the vulnerable by rescinding based on flimsy or non-existent evidence, not expecting the insured to fight back, more frequently their evidence contains some modicum of substance. Notwithstanding these hurdles, insureds do have a fighting chance under Florida law.

Waiver. “[W]hen an insurer has knowledge of the existence of facts justifying a forfeiture of the policy, any unequivocal act which recognizes the continued existence of the policy or which is wholly inconsistent with a forfeiture, will constitute a waiver thereof.” Johnson at 815. The elements of waiver are: (1) the existence at the time of the waiver of a right, privilege, advantage, or benefit which may be waived; (2) the actual or constructive knowledge of the right; and (3) the intention to relinquish the right. Capital Bank v. Needle, 596 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Taylor v. Kenco Chemical & Mfg. Corp., 465 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

Johnson involved a life insurance policy. Following the insured’s death, the carrier sought to rescind the policy based on misrepresentation. It was clear that the insurance application contained material misrepresentations concerning the insured’s health and medical treatment before issuance of the policy. It was also uncontroverted that the insurance agent became aware of the misrepresentations only two months after the date of the issuance of the policy, yet the carrier continued to accept and collect premiums with constructive notice of these facts. (The carrier did not challenge that the knowledge acquired by the agent was imputable to it, the principal, even though the agent might not have communicated the information to the company. On this issue, the Johnson court wrote: “[U]nder the circumstances here present the knowledge of the agent is imputable to his principal whether disclosed by him to it or not, and the company will be bound by such knowledge. See National Life & Accident Ins. Co., Inc., v. Travis et al., Tex. Civ.App., 128 S.W.2d 867; Poole v. Travelers Ins. Co. et al., 130 Fla. 806, 179 So. 138.”)

Failing to take acts necessary to effectuate rescission. In Leonardo v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 675 So.2d 176 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), a case involving a theft policy, the court of appeal reversed summary judgment for the carrier in a rescission case because, in part, the carrier did not remit, or even make a tender of, any premiums paid by the insured for the allegedly void policy. (The appeal court also reversed on waiver grounds, because State Farm continued to bill the insured and accept payment of premiums for a considerable period of time after denying his claim, and after notifying him of its intent to void the policy.)
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dollars.jpgThe Medicare Secondary Payer Act of 1980 (“MSP”) — Link to the MSP Manual — was enacted to limit the financial burden on taxpayers for the medical expenses of Medicare beneficiaries whose medical needs are the primary responsibility of some other source.

Until 2010, the MSP’s main focus was on workers’ compensation cases. (Florida’s workers’ compensation laws are contained in Chapter 440 of Florida’s statutes.) Injured workers who receive a lump sum settlement in a workers’ compensation case are required to pay all or a portion of those proceeds for the medical care related to their job accident injuries before Medicare will pay penny-one. While third-party civil liability plaintiffs have always been expected to reimburse Medicare for benefits paid in the past, the same regulations with regard to future coverage was never applied. In other words, Medicare was not expecting these Medicare beneficiaries to cover the expenses of future medical care resulting from their accidents from settlement proceeds.

For some time, The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), the federal agency responsible for administering Medicare and Medicaid (as well as a host of other federal programs ) within the Department of Health and Human Services, has been hinting that the Medicare Secondary Payer Act applied to future medical services in third party liability cases, pointing out that the statutory language is the same for workers’ compensation and liability cases. With regard to liability cases, Barbara Wright of CMS stated: “So where future medicals are a consideration in arriving at the settlement, appropriate arrangements should be made for appropriate exhaustion of the settlement before Medicare is billed for related services.”

One consequence of this new thinking is that insurers and self-insured entities are currently required to report claims made by Medicare-eligible claimant/plaintiffs to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”). This suggests that “appropriate exhaustion of the settlement before Medicare is billed for related services” is required “before Medicare is billed for related services” in personal injury cases. Interestingly, as of the posting of this blog, Medicare has not taken the next step of denying the payment of bills where the care is related to injuries sustained in an accident for which future medicals were considered in arriving at a settlement.
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people.jpgOur client was a passenger in a Dodge Dakota truck owned and leased by Enterprise Leasing Company, when it overturned two to three times on the highway at high speed. The driver, who had rented the truck from Enterprise, had fallen asleep at the wheel. Our severely injured client was airlifted to Shands Hospital, in Gainesville, Florida.

We filed suit against the uninsured driver and Enterprise. We alleged that Enterprise negligently entrusted its truck to the driver. The facts forming the basis of this allegation against Enterprise:

  • The driver had a suspended Florida drivers license at the time of the lease transaction. While the driver presented to the Enterprise agent what appeared to be a facially valid Texas drivers license, it is unlawful to operate a vehicle in Florida when that driver has a suspended license in any state. Enterprise failed to perform a simple and inexpensive computer search to determine if the driver had a suspended license.
  • The credit card the driver presented to the Enterprise agent was rejected. Enterprise nevertheless rented the vehicle, in violation of its own policies and procedures, which called for the production of other forms of proof of personal responsibility.

Once upon a time, rental car companies could be held vicariously liable for injuries caused by the negligent operation of their vehicles by authorized drivers. (Whether vicarious liability applied in a state was a matter of state law. Florida is a vicarious liability state. Vicarious liability has been recognized in Florida since 1920. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). Under this doctrine, a vehicle owner is liable without fault for damages caused by the negligent operation of his or her vehicle by a consensual driver.) As to rental agencies, this standard ended in 2005, when a Republican Congress, at the urging of then-President George Bush, passed the so-called Graves Amendment. The Graves Amendment substituted federal law for state law, providing blanket immunity to rental companies from vicarious liability. (So much for states’ rights!)

While the Graves Amendment relieved rental companies from vicarious liability, it allowed to remain in place actions against agencies for negligent entrustment. The distinguishing feature of negligent entrustment from vicarious liability is that the owner is independently at fault in granting consensual use of the vehicle. Florida courts consistently hold that one who negligently entrusts a car to someone is liable for damages flowing from the misuse of that car. Clooney v. Geetting, 352 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977) (“we see no reason why this theory is not available to claimants injured in automobile accidents in this state.”) The Florida Supreme Court long ago held that because the use of a dangerous instrumentality involves such a high degree of risk of serious injury or death, the highest degree of care is required. Skinner v. Ochiltree, 5 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1941).

Enterprise denied that it negligently entrusted its vehicle to the at-fault driver. Enterprise argued that section 322.38, Florida Statutes, limited the scope of its duty to our client, that it had no responsibility to investigate the status of the driver’s driver’s license beyond “facial validity,” contending that one’s driving record or background should not influence its decision to rent one a car, and that a declined credit card is irrelevant to a negligent entrustment claim under section 322.38 as a matter of law. (We presented evidence that poor credit is an indicia of risk recognized by rental agencies and insurance companies.) The trial court agreed with Enterprise, granting summary judgment in its favor.
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valentin crash.JPGFor two weeks in November of 2013, I had the privilege of participating in a uniquely American experience. I participated in a civil jury trial in Orlando, Florida (in the Orange County Courthouse, the same courthouse in which Casey Anthony was on trial for first degree murder in the death of her daughter). I was joined in this priceless experience by my brother-in-law, Sean Domnick, the managing partner of Domnick & Shevin, PL, and Jennifer Lipinski, one of his law partners.

On March 23, 2013, a Mears Transportation Services driver stopped her motor coach in the right lane of Epcot Center Drive, approximately 1000 feet from the Epcot Theme Park vehicle entrance, to inspect the outside of the coach for the source of a “new” noise she claimed to be hearing. After activating the coach’s four-way flashers, the driver, who had no mechanical training, exited the vehicle to perform the inspection. While her testimony was that the noise might mean a wheel base fire, she did not take the vehicle’s fire extinguisher with her on the inspection. After slowly circling the motor coach, the driver then walked down to the tree line alongside the roadway to make a personal phone call. (An independent eyewitness saw her on the telephone down by the tree line.) Ten seconds into this personal call — confirmed by cell phone records — our client, a Walt Disney World bus driver, crashed his Disney bus into the back of the Mears motor coach at approximately 30 mph.

The accident happened at 2:00 pm on a clear and sunny day. Our client testified that he first observed the Mears motor coach from about 1000 feet off, when approaching from behind on Epcot Center Drive, but did not perceive that it was stopped. When he finally perceived that the coach was stopped, it was too late for him to avoid the crash.
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us supreme court.jpgMedicaid will sometimes pay the medical expenses incurred by a person injured in an accident, albeit at rates substantially below the medical provider’s usual and customary charges. When Medicaid does pay, beneficiaries must reimburse Medicaid from third party payments for medical care. See section 409.910(11)(f), Florida Statutes (2013). The goal of the statute is to protect tax dollars while preventing Medicaid beneficiaries from receiving a windfall. Tristani v. Richman, 652 F.3d 360, 370, at 372 (3d Cir. 2011).

In Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that the Medicaid lien was limited to payments for medical care. Id. at 284. At issue in Ahlborn was a North Carolina Medicaid lien statute similar to Florida’s.

In spite of Ahlborn, AHCA, which administers Florida’s Medicaid system, insisted that its payments could be recovered from the entire settlement without regard to the various other damage elements typically constituting the basis of a settlement. (In addition to incurred medical expenses, personal injury cases usually also involve claims for lost wages, future medical expenses, mental anguish, and pain. According to Ahlborn, Medicaid’s lien only attaches to the payments made for medical care.) Moreover, ACHA refused to negotiate or even concede that any court had a say in the matter. AHCA’s brazenness was challenged.

In Roberts v. Albertson’s Inc., 37 Fla. L. Weekly D2515 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 24, 2012), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, modified on reh’g, No. 4D10-2313 (Fla. 4th DCA June 26, 2013), the Fourth District Court of Appeal issued a decision authorizing the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the Medicaid lien. The court could consider evidence of payments for such other damages as lost wages, pain, and mental anguish, as well as determine how much less the case settled for than its full value. (Cases are often settled for less than full actual damages due to a variety of factors including comparative fault and limited insurance coverage.)
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