Jeffrey P. Gale, P.A. // Understanding Florida’s Rear-End Collision Presumption

In 1958, Florida joined a small number of states in adopting a legal presumption of negligence against trailing drivers involved in rear-end motor vehicle collisions. This shift was established in McNulty v. Cusack, 104 So.2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958), and later endorsed by the Florida Supreme Court in Bellere v. Madsen, 114 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1959).

The Legal Rationale

The presumption is rooted in practical evidentiary concerns. Typically, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving all four elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. But in rear-end crashes, plaintiffs often know they were hit from behind but have no access to the circumstances leading up to the impact—leaving gaps in proof for breach and causation.

To address this, Florida courts created a rebuttable presumption: if a rear-end collision occurs, the trailing driver is presumed negligent. This shifts the burden of production to the defendant, who must offer a “substantial and reasonable explanation” to overcome the presumption. If successful, the case proceeds to the jury without the benefit of the presumption. See Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So.2d 26, 28–29 (Fla. 1965); Brethauer v. Brassell, 347 So.2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).

Originally developed during Florida’s contributory negligence era—where any negligence on the plaintiff’s part barred recovery—the rule had significant weight. Under today’s comparative fault framework, however, negligence is apportioned, and partial fault does not automatically defeat a claim. See Shayne v. Saunders, 176 So. 495 (Fla. 1937); Stephens v. Dichtenmueller, 207 So.2d 718 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), quashed on other grounds.

Modern Interpretation: Birge v. Charron

In Birge v. Charron, 107 So.3d 350 (Fla. 2012), the Florida Supreme Court clarified that the rear-end presumption is “an evidentiary tool” designed to bridge gaps in liability and causation when evidence is one-sided. Importantly, it is not absolute.

Where there is evidence that the front driver may have been negligent, the presumption is rebutted. At that point, the case must go to a jury for resolution—without the presumption. It may remain only as a permissible inference the jury is free to accept or reject. This standard was reaffirmed in Crime v. Looney, 328 So.3d 1157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021).

Real-World Application: A Case Study

We recently handled a case involving a catastrophic, multi-vehicle crash on Florida’s Turnpike. Our client was sideswiped by an SUV that had been rear-ended, causing their vehicle to be propelled into a tree at high speed. The chain-reaction began with a rear-end collision—clearly placing the trailing vehicle at the center of the causation analysis.

We argued that the presumption of negligence should apply to the vehicle that initiated the sequence. However, the court noted that the rear-ended SUV had come to a sudden stop on a section of highway where such stops are not expected, unlike urban roads with frequent stops for businesses or intersections.

Because there was a factual dispute over whether the front vehicle’s conduct contributed to the crash, the court ruled that the presumption did not apply. The case ultimately settled for a confidential amount.

Key Takeaways

• Presumption of Negligence: In Florida, a rear-end collision creates a presumption that the trailing driver was negligent.

• Rebuttable Standard: The presumption can be rebutted by presenting a reasonable explanation (e.g., sudden, unexpected stop by the lead vehicle).

• Comparative Fault: Even if the lead driver was partially at fault, liability can be shared rather than barred entirely.

• Not Always Applicable: The presumption is less likely to apply on highways or areas where sudden stops are unusual.

This rule continues to play a vital role in rear-end crash litigation, especially where direct evidence is hard to come by. But as our case illustrates, it is not a one-size-fits-all solution.