Florida Injury Attorney Blawg

Florida Statute 440.205 is supposed to protect employees from being terminated for making workers' compensation claims. Making a claim can be as simple as reporting an accident. It does not require the filing of a formal Petition for Benefits with DOAH.

Proving a claim for wrongful termination can be difficult. Florida employers are not required to modify work duties or hold jobs open while employees recover from injuries, and Florida is an "At Will" employment state, a legal principle that allows employers to terminate employees at will, for no reason at all. (Thankfully, in addition to the protections of 440.205, At Will is constrained by the U.S. Constitution's prohibition against discrimination based on age, race, and religion. Whistleblowers, individuals who report illegal activity, also are protected against At Will termination. Ironically, it is often safer for employers to fire employees for no reason at all than to fire for particular reasons.)

Employers hide behind these protections when accused of wrongful termination. In appropriate situations, they should be challenged.

An employer found to have violated 440.205, can be liable for civil damages such as lost wages and emotional distress, and subject to criminal fines as a second degree misdemeanor.

Continue reading "Protection From Wrongful Termination for Injured Florida Workers" »

I have blogged here in the past that the 2011 Republican-controlled Florida Legislature seemed bound and determined to gut one of the state's most important laws at holding vehicle manufacturers accountable for producing defective products. Although some within the legislature may have had this outcome as a goal, reasonable minds prevailed in the 2011 legislative session to the extent that the legislative body's modifications did not eviscerate the law as many within the civil justice community had feared.

The principle of law under discussion is the crashworthiness doctrine. It stands for the proposition that vehicle manufacturers can be liable for harm caused by unsafe vehicles, even if the vehicle was put to the test by another negligent party. Kidron v. Carmona, 665 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995) (following Larson v. General Motors, 391 F. 2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968)).

The principle was later bolstered by the holding in D'Amario v. Ford, 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001), which limited the use of comparative fault in crashworthiness cases.

In D'Amario a minor was the passenger in a vehicle that struck a tree. A fire began that ended in an explosion, causing the minor to lose three limbs and suffering burns to much of his body. The fire resulted from a defective relay switch manufactured by Ford.

The minor and his mother sued Ford for the damages resulting from the defective switch. They did not seek to recover compensation from Ford for injuries from striking the tree.

At trial, Ford sought to introduce evidence as to the cause of the initial accident, which was that another minor was intoxicated and negligently drove the vehicle into the tree. The plaintiffs (mother and son) argued that this evidence was irrelevant to the claim for damages caused by the defective switch. The trial court admitted the evidence, meaning that it allowed the jury to hear the evidence. The jury returned a verdict for Ford.

The case was appealed and made its way to the Florida Supreme Court. The court considered cases from other states and concluded that the majority view in the nation was that such impact evidence was relevant. Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the minority view, ruling in favor of the catastrophically injured minor and his mother.

Before D'Amario, in crashworthiness cases jurors were allowed to hear evidence of the driver's fault and apportion damages against the driver. This tended to direct the focus of responsibility onto the negligent driver and take it off the manufacturer whose defective product caused the enhanced injury. D'Amario eliminated the chance of such evidence distracting, confusing, or angering juries.

Not surprisingly, automobile manufacturers have been trying for ten years to reverse D'Amario. Many thought their goal would be accomplished in the 2011 legislative session. Although a measure was proposed that would have satisfied the manufacturers, amendments filed on the Senate Floor by Senator David Simmons (R) and passed by both chambers of the Legislature prevented the crashworthiness doctrine from being eliminated altogether in Florida. The bill that passed, which does modify D'Amario, revised Florida Statute 768.81.

The revised 768.81(3)(b) provides as follows:

In a products liability action alleging that injuries received by a claimant in an accident were enhanced by a defective product, the trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the accident when apportioning fault between or among them. The jury shall be appropriately instructed by the trial judge on the apportionment of fault in products liability actions where there are allegations that the injuries received by the claimant in an accident were enhanced by a defective product. The rules of evidence apply to these actions.

Continue reading "Florida Legislature Leaves Intact Much of the Crashworthiness (D'Amario) Doctrine" »

Personal injury cases against drunk drivers present positive opportunities for Plaintiff lawyers to seek punitive damages and recover enhanced compensatory damages (e.g., pain & suffering; lost wages).

Punitive Damages

The procedure for claiming punitive damages and the standards for holding a defendant liable for punitive damages are set forth in Florida Statute 768.72.

A claim for punitive damages may not be plead in the initial complaint. Rather, the Plaintiff must seek leave of court to amend the complaint to claim punitive damages. The judge should allow the amendment if evidence in the record or proferred by the Plaintiff provides a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages. Simeon, Inc. v. Cox, 671 So.2d 158 (Fla.1996) and F.S. 768.72(1). Contrary to the proposition often put forward by Defendants, the statute does not require an evidentiary hearing to permit the amendment. Pursuant to section 768.72, a proffer of evidence can support a trial court's determination. Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 677 So.2d 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

768.72 says this about what must be shown to establish liability:

(2) A defendant may be held liable for punitive damages only if the trier of fact, based on clear and convincing evidence, finds that the defendant was personally guilty of intentional misconduct or gross negligence. As used in this section, the term:

(a) "Intentional misconduct" means that the defendant had actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct and the high probability that injury or damage to the claimant would result and, despite that knowledge, intentionally pursued that course of conduct, resulting in injury or damage.

(b) "Gross negligence" means that the defendant's conduct was so reckless or wanting in care that it constituted a conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed to such conduct.

Continue reading "Strategies for Handling Florida Personal Injury Claims Against Drunk (DUI) Drivers" »

Through legal doctrines such as those pertaining to dangerous instruments (e.g., motor vehicles), principals & agents, and employers & employees, passive tortfeasors can be held liable for the active negligence of others. An active tortfeasor is the person whose negligence has caused an accident, while a passive tortfeasor is the person or company made liable through one or more legal doctrines such as those mentioned above. This type of liability on the part of the passive tortfeasor is known as vicarious liability.

Examples: #1: Through the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, the owner of a motor vehicle will be liable for damages caused by the permissive driver of that vehicle. #2: An employer will be responsible for the damages caused by its employee in the course and scope of the employment. (Our law firm is currently in suit against Mears Destination Services, Inc. for an accident caused by the driver of one of its buses. Mears is vicariously liable under both examples.)

For various practical and strategic reasons, it is sometimes beneficial for the Plaintiff (the party harmed) to reach a settlement with the active tortfeasor, while the passive tortfeasor remains a Defendant in the case. Can this be done without [the Plaintiff] losing the right to continue his or her fight against the passive tortfeasor? Although it may seem counterintuitive, the answer is Yes.

This wasn't always so. It took statutes then court opinions based on the statutes to change the law. The first positive Florida statute was enacted in 1957, while the first good appellate decision interpreting the statute was Hertz Corp. v. Hellens, 140 So.2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). Since then, Florida law has become even clearer on the subject through the following authorities:

Florida Statutes:

• 768.041 Release or covenant not to sue.


• 46.015 Release of parties.


• 768.31(5) Release or covenant not to sue.

Case Law:

• Florida Tomato Packers, Inc. v. Wilson, 296 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (The plaintiff settled before trial and executed a release in favor of the only active tortfeasor).

Another aspect that was, but is no longer problematic when settling with active tortfeasors concerns dismissals with prejudice. In JFK Medical Center, Inc. v. Price, 647 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1994), a medical malpractice case, the Plaintiff settled with the active tortfeasor doctor, agreeing to dismiss the case against him with prejudice. The passive hospital, which was a party due to its alleged employer/employee relationship with the doctor, moved for summary judgment on the theory of res judicata, arguing that the claim against it was barred by the active tortfeasor being dismissed with prejudice. The trial court granted the hospital's motion. The 4th DCA reversed the trial court and the Florida Supreme Court approved the appellate court's decision, holding "that a voluntary dismissal of the active tortfeasor, with prejudice, entered by agreement of the parties pursuant to settlement, is not the equivalent of an adjudication on the merits that will serve as a bar to continued litigation against the passive tortfeasor." 647 So. 2d at 834.

Continue reading "Florida Personal Injury Law: Releasing Active Tortfeasors" »

Job one of lawyers who represent individuals who have suffered personal injuries and/or property damage losses is to maximize the client's recovery. The conventional thinking is that the recovery in every case is limited by the measure of actual damages, in other words, the recovery cannot exceed the loss.

Surprisingly, this is a rule that can be broken ... with a proviso.

In Despointes v. Florida Power Corporation, 2 So.3d 360 (2nd DCA 2008), a person who was paid $224,567.66 by her own insurance company, CIGNA, for fire damage, was able to pursue a claim for damages, through her estate, against a third party for the amount already recovered from the insurance company.

The device used for this opportunity was an assignment from CIGNA of its subrogation/reimbursement right.

The CIGNA policy provided for the right of subrogation against any third party recovery. This right authorized CIGNA to pursue a claim against the third party responsible for causing the house fire for the amount it paid to its insured. Instead of pursuing the claim, it assigned the right to its insured.

Thereafter, the insured sued the third party, Intermatic, alleging that the fire had been caused by a defective surge protector. The Defendant argued that the insured was not allowed to recover the money she had already received.

The trial court agreed. The Second District Court of Appeal did not.

Continue reading "Florida Law: Maximize Recovery by Obtaining Assignment of Subrogation Rights" »

The most important job of every personal injury lawyer is to maximize the amount of his or her client's monetary recovery. The damage elements of every personal injury case are "pain & suffering" and economic damages (which includes lost wages, loss of earning capacity, out-of-pocket expenses, and past and future medical expenses). The nature and extent of the injuries bear on every element of damages. Accordingly, effectively demonstrating the nature and extent of the injuries is a critical component in every personal injury case. Various methods are available.

Although medical illustrations, both generic and case-specific, are the traditional way of demonstrating injuries, they continue to serve a convincing role in presenting evidence in today's high tech world. Generic illustrations are less costly and can be used in other cases, but may have less impact than case-specific demonstrations. For spine injuries, showing a summary of pain management injections is effective. The exhibit will visually show every date injections were administered, along with the location, size, and shape of each needle and syringe entering the spine. To have this chart made, the medical illustrator must be provided with the medical records containing the injections information or a summary detailing the information.

Continue reading "Effective Ways of Demonstrating Serious Injuries in Personal Injury Cases" »

One would hope and expect in a society purporting to be civilized, that the negligence of any person or company could not be waived before it happened. Astonishingly, Florida law allows just that: pre-accident releases/waivers barring actions based on the subsequent negligence of the released party.

In other words, Florida law sanctions the equivalent of the Monopoly game, "Get out of Jail Free" pass to those whose wrongoing may injure or kill others.

Cognizant of the tremendous consquences of this law - for example, no hope of compensation for a catastrophically injured person - Florida courts have at least decided that contracts which purport to release or indemnify a party for its own negligence are looked upon with disfavor and will not be enforced unless the instrument clearly and specifically provides for a limitation or elimination of liability for such acts. University Plaza Shopping Center v. Stewart, 272 So. 2d 507, 511 (Fla. 1973). Moreover, it may be settled law that the word "negligence" must appear in the release. See, Bender v. Caregivers of America, Inc., 42 So.3d 893 (Fla 4th DCA 2010); Travent, Ltd. v. Schecter, 718 So. 2d 939, 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Witt v. Dolphin Research Ctr., Inc., 692 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Rosenberg v. Cape Coral Plumbing Inc., 920 So. 2d 61, 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); and Levine v. A. Madley Corp., 516 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

Continue reading "Florida Law: Pre-Incident Waivers Precluding Actions Based on Subsequent Negligence" »

In a previous blog, The Truth About the McDonalds Coffee Spill Case - Fallacy Debunked, I presented the honest facts about the infamous McDonald's Coffee Spill case. Sadly, the truth bears little resemblence to the shameless lies spread by Corporate America.

Why would Corporate America lie about this case? Simple. To influence the American public to push for laws making it more difficult for individuals to hold Corporate America accountable for its negligent behavior. In other words, fool people into supporting laws that are harmful to their own and America's best interests.

Corporate America saw the case, which involved the spilling of coffee and a large jury verdict, as the perfect vehicle for attacking the civil justice system. It figured that unknowing individuals would accept its lies and distortions without question, causing them to revolt against the very system that stands between them and total control by corporate interests. Frighteningly, they figured right. (Even seemingly well-educated people have fallen for the garbage. My rabbi wrongly used the case as the theme of his Yom Kippur sermon. When I called him on it days later, he made further stupid arguments to support his misguided position, unwilling and unable through years of propoganda to admit that he was wrong. He is now my former rabbi because I have chosen to worship elsewhere.)

Continue reading ""Hot Coffee" - HBO to Air Documentary Exposing the McDonald's Coffee Case Lies" »

Accidents caused by broken chairs are not uncommon. In some cases, the injuries can be severe (e.g., broken bones; herniated intervertebral discs). Through normal wear and tear, defects can develop that create conditions for imminent accidents. To avoid these dangerous situations, it is necessary to be reasonably observant and even pro-active with regard to determining the condition of chairs. This is especially so for commercial enterprises catering to the public.

In Fontana v. Wilson World Maingate, 717 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), Fontana, while a guest of the defendant/appellee's hotel, sat in a chair which was defective causing it to collapse and injure her. The defendant did not deny that the chair was defective. However, at trial it argued that the case should be dismissed because there was no evidence that it knew or reasonably should have known of the defect. The trial judge agreed, leading to a directed verdict in favor of the defendant.

Continue reading "Florida Civil Law: Liability for Injuries Caused by Broken Chairs" »

McCall vs. Alabama Bruno's, Inc., 647 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994): Florida follows the general rule that the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the contractor's negligence because the employer has no control over the manner in which the work is done, except when one of three exceptions apply. Those exceptions involve:

1. Negligence in selecting, instructing or supervising the contractor;


2. Non-delegable duties arising out of some relation toward the public or the particular plaintiff;


3. Work which is specially, peculiarly, or "inherently" dangerous.

Peculiar does not mean that the risk must be one which is abnormal to the type of work done, or that it must be an abnormally great risk, but instead refers to a special recognizable danger arising out of the work itself. In order for the vicarious liability rules to apply, it is not essential that the work which the contractor is employed to do be in itself an extra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity, or that it involve a very high degree of risk to those in the vicinity. It is sufficient that it is likely to involve a peculiar risk of physical harm unless special precautions are taken, even though the risk is not abnormally great. A "peculiar risk" differs from common risks to which persons in general are commonly subjected by the ordinary forms of negligence which are usual in the community. It must involve some special hazard resulting from the nature of the work done, which calls for special precautions. Restatement (2d) Torts Sect. 416. Rules imposing vicarious liability on employers for the acts of independent contractors arise "in situations where, for reasons of policy, the employer is not permitted to shift the responsibility for the proper conduct of the work to the contractor" and it is commonly stated that "the employer is under a duty which he is not free to delegate to the contractor." Nondelegable duties have been found under Florida law to arise out of "inherently dangerous activity," activity involving "inherently dangerous elements," or out of the creation of an "inherently dangerous condition."

Webb vs. Priest, 413 So.2d 43 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982): The general rule in Florida is that an owner is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor except when (a) the activity is inherently dangerous (see Ferguson vs. Westinghouse, 408 So.2d 659 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981)); (b) the owner/employer had contractually assumed responsibility (Levitz vs. Continental Equities, 411 So.2d 221 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982)); (c) there is legally imposed responsibility (Concord Florida vs. Lewin, 341 So.2d 242 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977)); (d) the owner/employer knew or had reason to know that the independent contractor would not perform in a satisfactory manner (Williams vs. Wometco Enterprises, 287 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974)); (e) where the independent contractor had apparent authority to act on behalf of the owner/employer (Thomkin Corp. vs. Miller, 156 Fla. 388, 24 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1945).

Continue reading "Case Law Summary of Florida Employer v. Independent Contractor Liability" »

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 1.360(a)(1)(A) allows the defendant in a personal injury case to have a qualified expert of its own choosing perform a medical examination on the plaintiff with regard to the injury or injuries in controversy. This type of examination has come to be referred to as a "compulsory medical examination," or "CME."

The notice of the examination is served by the defendant on the plaintiff's attorney. The Rule provides that the request "shall specify a reasonable time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination...." The reason for the specificity requirement is to give the plaintiff the opportunity to impose objections to the request if necessary.

The question often arises as to whether or not the CME doctor is allowed to perform invasive testing such as X-rays. The answer is a conditional Yes.

In Schagrin v. Nacht, 683 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), paragraph 4 of the defendant's request read as follows:

The scope of the examination is of a urological nature concerning conditions of the Plaintiff relating to the accident which is the subject matter of this lawsuit. The exam shall include any such tests that the doctor feels are necessary for a complete and thorough examination of the Plaintiff.

Continue reading "Florida Personal Injury Litigation: Compulsory Medical Exam (CME) & Invasive Procedures (e.g., X-rays)" »

In 2004, more than 80-percent of Florida voters passed Amendment 7, technically Article 10 Section 25 of Florida's Constitution, commonly known as the "Patients' Right to Know Act." The amendment provides that "patients have a right to have access to any records made or received in the course of business by a health care facility or provider relating to any adverse medical incident."

Not surprisingly, a number of hospitals quickly lined up to challenge the scope of the voter-approved constitutional amendment. In essence, they sought to keep from having to produce documents relating to the investigation of adverse medical incidents, and in one of the cases, relating to the selection, retention, or termination of a doctor accused of medical negligence.

In 2008, The Florida Supreme Court, in Florida Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478 (Fla., 2007), ruled against the hospitals, declaring that the shroud of privilege that existed in Florida with regard to medical records had been lifted by Amendment 7 to "allow patients to better determine from whom they should seek health care, evaluate the quality and fitness of health care providers currently rendering service to them, and allow them access to information gathered through the self-policing processes during the discovery period of litigation filed by injured patients or the estates of deceased patients against their health care providers." (The quoted language was used by the Supreme Court from the written opinion of Judge Sawaya in Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 932 So.2d 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

Continue reading "Medical Malpractice (Amendment 7): Florida Hospitals Thumb Noses at Voters and Supreme Court" »

The question often arises in civil cases as to which witnesses the Plaintiff's lawyer is prohibited from communicating with outside the presence of the Defendant's counsel. The answer is governed by Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-4.2.

The Rule was put to the test in the context of a medical malpractice case in Lee Memorial Health System, d/b/a Healthpark Medical Center v. Jeffrey Smith and Melissa Smith, individually, and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Kiarra Summer Smith, a minor, 40 So.3d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). The Smiths filed a medical malpractice action on behalf of their daughter against Lee Memorial. In their complaint, they alleged that the hospital fell below the standard of care in calculating nutritional solutions. The injuries alleged in the complaint included permanent neurological damage, lack of normal head growth, and cerebral palsy.

While the suit was ongoing, the child was receiving care and treatment from a pediatric neurologist and several other physicians who were employed by Lee Memorial. The child's lawyers tried to meet with the doctors to discuss her medical condition. Lee Memorial asked the court to prohibit the meetings. The circuit court refused, so Lee Memorial petitioned the district court of appeal to do so. It also refused, reasoning as follows:

The prohibition against communicating with members of a represented organization [like Lee Memorial] is applicable to only three categories of persons or employees: (1) those who supervise, direct, or regularly consult with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter; (2) those who have the authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter; or (3) those whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.

The court decided that none of the child's treating doctors fell within any of these categories.

Continue reading "Florida Medical Malpractice - Communicating With Treating Doctors Employed By Defendant Hospital" »

Uninsured Motorist (UM) coverage is 1st party insurance maintained for the benefit of individuals injured by uninsured motorists.

See these blogs:

• Florida 4th in the Nation in Number of Uninsured Vehicles


• Florida Motor Vehicle Insurance Law: What is Stacked Coverage?


• "Full Coverage" Vehicle Accident Insurance in Florida

An insurance policy is a contract. Unless preempted by a statute or case law, the terms of the policy determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the contract, namely the insurer and the insured.

A common policy requirement is for the insured to submit to what is called a Compulsory Medical Examination (CME). A CME is where the insured, who is seeking compensation under the policy for an injury or injuries, is examined by a doctor selected by the insurance company. When requested by the insurer, submitting to the CME is a condition precedent to receiving benefits under the policy, meaning that the insurance company can deny benefits to the insured for failing to attend the CME.

Disputes have arisen between insurer and insured over what is allowed by the CME provision. How frequently may the insurer force the insured to attend CMEs? How far can the carrier make the insured travel to attend the CME? Is there limit on the type of doctor who may perform the CME?

Continue reading "Compulsory Medical Exam - Florida Uninsured Motorist (UM) Insureds Beware!" »

Hurray for the Miami Heat. Boo (and shame on) Micky Arinson, the billionaire owner of the Heat.

Micky Arison also owns Carnival Corporation, the world's largest cruise operator. While the company operates many of its ships from American ports, enjoying the laws and protections only America can afford, it hides behind a labyrinth of one-sided procedures and antiquated laws that effectively limit the ability of its passengers to be fairly compensated for serious losses suffered on the high seas, including the most serious loss of all, the loss of life.

First, the procedural issues:

• Pursuant to the passengers' ticket, passengers who are injured on cruise ships operated by Carnival, Celebrity, Norwegian, Costa, or Royal Caribbean are required to bring claims in Federal Court in South Florida.


• Within six months of an accident, injured passengers must submit a detalied letter to the defendant describing the accident. Failure to do this may bar further action by the victim.


• A one-year statute of limitations. In other words, a lawsuit must be brought within one year of the accident.


• The victim must travel to Miami to be deposed. In addition, the defendant has the right to perform a medical examination on the victim in Miami, and the mediation and the trial take place in Miami. These venue issues can present significant hardships to the plaintiff, who usually resides in another state or another country altogether.

Perhaps the greatest affront is the limited recovery afforded survivors of loved ones who die on the high seas as a result of negligence occurring onboard a ship. This limitation is prescribed by the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). Where a plaintiff dies on the high seas beyond a marine league [i.e., three nautical miles] from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the survivors of the decedent are limited to pecuniary losses - essentially related medical bills and funeral expenses. Non-economic damages such as pain and suffering, loss of society, services and comfort of spouse, parent or child cannot be claimed. (Contrast these limits to Florida's Wrongful Death Act, which affords certain survivors the right to recover these damages.)

Continue reading "Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) - Cruise Passengers Beware!!!" »